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Introduction
The Death of One Chinese Man in the Japanese Empire
The date was September 12th, 1923; the time was a little before dawn. Four men were
descending from Sakai Bridge near Komatsu River in Tokyo’s Kameido District, approaching
the embankment. Three of them were Japanese soldiers. The fourth was a young Chinese man
named Wang Xitian.1 As they walked closer to a concrete pillar, the officer among the three
soldiers, Sasaki Heikichi, suggested, “Let’s take a short break here.” Wang complied, leaning
against the pillar, facing Sasaki. As he did so, a fifth figure—another Japanese soldier—emerged
from behind the pillar he was leaning on. The soldier drew his knife and slashed at Wang’s neck
from behind. Wang fell forward. He was dead in no time. His killer met Sasaki’s eyes, and
walked away in silence.2
The killer’s name was Kakiuchi Yasuo. Almost sixty years later, in 1981, he would
confess to having followed Sasaki’s order of “getting rid of one man.”3 But back on September
12th, 1923, everything was done in secrecy: Kakiuchi’s identity was not revealed, nor was any
information of Wang’s death. It would take several decades for Wang’s family and friends to
learn that the missing 27-year-old, who set out to check on a community of Chinese workers in
the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake, was in fact murdered. In the interim, the Japanese
government would conceal the truth behind Wang’s death, despite persistent pressure and
queries from Chinese authorities.
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Who, then, was Wang Xitian? There is little written about his life, and almost nothing in
English.4 In general, moreover, the mass killing of Chinese people in Tokyo after the earthquake
in 1923 has received very little attention in English scholarship and has been overshadowed by
the larger scale massacre of Koreans. From a smattering of Chinese and Japanese sources,
however, fragments of Wang Xitian’s life can be pieced together to form a larger picture that
shows his life at the intersection of two vastly different Chinese experiences in early 20th century
Tokyo: that of the well-educated nationalist student, on the one hand, and that of the exploited
migrant worker on the other. While the two experiences seem dichotomized, Wang, a studentturned activist whose work engaged with both nationalism and workers’ rights, linked them. His
life, death, and social connections reflect not only the breadth of the Chinese experiences in
Tokyo, but also the intricate desires and anxieties within the Empire of Japan.
This thesis examines the way Wang served as a bridge between two worlds. The first two
sections focus not on Wang’s biographical details, but rather on the physical spaces in Tokyo he
lived in, and the Chinese experiences these physical spaces represent. The first section explores
the student-formed Chinatown in Kanda and its rising Chinese nationalism through literary and
political movements. The second section spotlights the formation of a Chinese workers’
neighborhood in Ōshima-machi and the marginalization and violence they faced. Then, the third
section examines how Wang Xitian’s life relates to both neighborhoods, and how his activism
led to his death. Finally, the fourth section discusses the first three sections in a larger historical
framework, and investigates how they relate to insecurities of, and opportunities within, the
Empire of Japan in the early 20th century.

4

Some secondary literature, like Eric Han’s book on the Yokohama Chinatown, mention his name in passing;
however, there is no biographical work on his life in English.
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This thesis argues that the Chinese experience in early 20th century Tokyo was
socioeconomically dichotomized yet consistently reflected Japan’s desire to classify and control
foreign populations at its core. It also suggests a significant change over time: between the
formation of the Kanda Chinatown and the Ōshima-machi worker community, a new Chinese
nationalism characterized less by class and more by ethnicity was formed in Tokyo, under the
influence of changing politics in China, growing tensions in Sino-Japan relations, and the spread
of new international ideas. This new national consciousness unified the previously dichotomized
Chinese experiences in Tokyo to some extent, causing figures like Wang Xitian to connect the
well-educated students with the more marginalized workers; its offensive nature to Japan’s
system of social classification also caused the empire to see people like Wang as a threat, which
eventually resulted in the simultaneous panicked massacre of the Chinese and the murder of
Wang after the earthquake in 1923.

Why Tokyo, and Why Wang Xitian?
There has been scholarship examining Chinese populations in the Empire of Japan, but
very little has been specifically written about the Chinese in Tokyo. Eric Han’s Rise of a
Japanese Chinatown examines the divisions and integrations within the Chinatown community
in Yokohama, but the differences between Yokohama and Tokyo were significant.5 Yokohama
was a treaty port; Tokyo was an imperial capital, whose planning reflected both population
mobility and national image-building. The way Tokyo handled migrant populations, therefore,
can reflect much more about the empire’s anxieties and desires.

5
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As for the Chinese experience in Tokyo, most secondary literature has been biographical,
focusing on the life of prominent figures such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Zhou Enlai, Lu
Xun and Yu Dafu. Detailed as these biographies can be, they reflect only the lives of a selected
elite minority, instead of a more comprehensive picture of Chinese experiences across various
classes. There is also David Ambaras’s Japan’s Imperial Underworlds, which examines
connections between Japan and more socioeconomically disadvantaged Chinese citizens.6
Ambaras, however, focuses on the connections between Japan and the southern China town of
Fuqing formed through marriages, while this thesis focuses on migrant workers from Wenzhou
and Chuzhou in eastern China who ended up in Ōshima-machi through the labor market.
Furthermore, using the life of Wang Xitian as an analytical lens, this thesis aims to suggest how
the elites’ and the workers’ experiences intertwined in the early 20th century Tokyo.

I. The Kanda Chinatown and Burgeoning Chinese Nationalism
The Student-based Chinatown of Jinbochō, Kanda
Jinbochō, Kanda, located a little north of the Imperial Palace, is known today for its
plethora of used bookstores. Back in the early 20th century, however, it was one of Tokyo’s
major Chinatowns and housed thousands of Chinese residents.7 Unlike the famous Chinatowns
in Yokohama or Kobe, the Chinatown in Kanda was short-lived: Japanese scholar Kashima
Shigeru calls it a “Dream Chinatown,” one that lasted no more than three decades and hardly has
any traces left nowadays.8
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David R. Ambaras, Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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The short-lived fate of the Kanda Chinatown is closely related to the way it was formed.
While the Chinatowns in Yokohama and Kobe were formed through the necessity of
international trade and opportunities for wealth in port cities, the majority of Kanda Chinatown’s
residents pursued not wealth, but education: they were mostly Chinese students, who left China
for Japan’s opportunities in higher education. According to architecture historian Fujinori
Terunobu, the “three defining conditions of a Chinatown” are the presence of restaurants,
barbers, and tailors. All three most definitely existed in Kanda in the early 20th century.9 These
businesses were established to serve the core population of this Chinatown: students. Fujinori
also notes that after the Great Kantō Earthquake, when most Chinese students evacuated from
Kanda, local businesses closed down as well, further confirming that the Kanda Chinatown was
formed through living necessities and social connections of Chinese students.10
The origins of this student-based Chinatown can be traced back to efforts of the educator
Kanō Jigorō, who founded in 1896, under the advice of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saionji
Kinmochi, a small private school for fourteen Chinese international students sponsored by the
Qing government.11 The school was located in Misakichō, Kanda, and taught subjects including
Japanese, mathematics, sciences and physical education; by 1899, seven students graduated and
returned to China, becoming prominent figures in government or educational institutions.12 The
success of Kanō’s first students encouraged the Qing government to continue sending students to
Japan, and Kanō expanded his school, naming it Hirofumi (Hongwen in Chinese) Academy.13

9
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With more demands for educational resources, more schools, including the famous East Asia
High School which many prominent Chinese political figures later attended, were founded in the
first decade of the 20th century.14 By 1906, there were already over ten thousand Chinese
students in Japan, and Kanda was often their first destination.15

The Life of Zhou Enlai and Lu Xun in the Kanda Chinatown
For the first three decades of the 20th century, the Kanda Chinatown continued to house
students who would become influential political and literary figures in China. Given the literacy
and popularity of such figures, many primary sources about their lives in Japan remain, and can
serve as important indications of the Chinese student’s experience in Tokyo at the time. One of
the most well-preserved sources is the diary of 19-year-old Zhou Enlai, who would later become
the first Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China. Zhou studied and lived in Kanda from
1917 to 1918, attending East Asia High School while preparing for the entrance exams of two
Japanese preparatory schools, Tokyo Higher Normal School and Tokyo First Higher School.
Zhou’s time in Kanda was short: he returned to China briefly for a month after failing the
entrance exams to both schools, then, upon returning to Japan in September 1918, moved to
Waseda to live in a communal dorm.16 However, during his time there, Zhou recorded many
moments that reflect the social connections, interactions, and lifestyles of Chinese students in the
Kanda Chinatown.
As Zhou notes in his diary the exact names of visitors he met with and wrote to each day,
it is easy to observe how the Chinese students in Kanda formed a close-knit social network,

14

Kashima, Kanda Jinbō-chō Shoshigai Kō, 279.
Li Lianqing, Lu Xun yu Riben (Beijing: Shijiezhishi Chubanshe, 1984), 110.
16
Yabuki Susumu, Shū Onrai “jūkyūsai no Tōkyō nikki” (Tōkyō: Shōgakkan, 1999), 372.
15

6

helping each other with housing, sharing news about college entrance exams, and even
supporting each other financially. On January 31, 1918, for instance, Zhou’s friend and former
secondary school classmate Wang Pushan recommended that Zhou move in with him, while
Zhou “let [his landlord] know that two other friends would like to move into [his old] place.”17
As limited housing resources made it hard for Chinese students to rent places in Tokyo, the
spontaneous social network provided much mutual support for living. Similarly, as the students
were mostly aiming for the same goals of entering Japanese colleges, news about exams
circulated fast among them: in March 1918, Zhou realized he had not passed the entrance exam
to Tokyo Higher Normal School before the results got publicly announced, for he learned about
his friend Zhang Honghao’s admission into the same school with Japanese people.18 Zhou also
received financial support from his social connections: the editor of Zhou’s diary in Japanese,
Yabuki Susumu, notes that Zhou borrowed and received from friends a total of 687.2 yuan—a
considerable amount for a student—for living and educational expenses over the course of
twenty-one months in Japan.19
While studying was the main task for students in Kanda, there was also entertainment and
social life recorded in Zhou’s diary. Zhou often wrote about social interactions: visiting friend’s
houses, eating out in local restaurants, discussing politics and philosophy, and occasionally going
to movies, shows, and department stores. On the evening of January 6, 1918, for instance, Zhou
and his friends “went to Asakusa to see an operetta together.”20 While Kanda had many Chinese
restaurants that served as gathering spots for Chinese students, it remained mainly a residential
district; for entertainment, therefore, the students often ventured out into the nearby districts of

17
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Ueno, Hibiya and Asakusa. Asakusa was a hub for cinematic and performance arts, while Ueno
and Hibiya, with their parks, became ideal spots for walks.21 Zhou, after taking his first entrance
exam on March 9, 1918, went to Hibiya park for a stroll with Wang Pushan: he wrote about
seeing groups of Japanese students, male and female, strolling, reading, and playing sports in the
park, and feeling how “it all contained an educational value” that exceeded children’s play in
China he had seen.22
Entertainment for Chinese students, however, could also be critiqued. The famous
Chinese writer and nationalist pioneer Lu Xun, who spent eight years in Japan prior to Zhou’s
arrival in Tokyo, recounts his distaste for Chinese students’ indulgence in social activities in his
personal essay, “Mr. Fujino.” “In the foyer of the Chinese Students’ Association, there are a few
books available for purchase, which makes it sometimes worthwhile to visit,” Lu writes. “But in
the evening, clamorous footsteps often resound on the floor of one of the rooms, and the air is
full of smoke: someone who is well versed in current affairs will explain, ‘They’re learning how
to dance.’”23
Lu, like Zhou Enlai, lived in the Kanda Chinatown. He first arrived at Tokyo in the
spring of 1902, as a Qing-sponsored student at Hirofumi Academy.24 He soon made literature his
vessel for nationalist ideals, as his works often reflected a sentiment of helping Chinese-speaking
populations understand their role in the world through international episodes. He translated the
French novelist Jules Verne’s science fiction From the Earth to the Moon from Japanese into
Chinese, in the hope of helping Chinese people “improve their thoughts and understand the way

21

Yabuki, Shū Onrai “jūkyūsai no Tōkyō nikki,” 246.
Zhou, “March 9, 1918,” from Zhou Enlai Lü Ri Riji.
23
Lu Xun, “Mr. Fujino,” from Zhao Hua Xi Shi (Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 1932).
24
Li, Lu Xun yu Riben, 1.
22

8

of world civilizations” through reading science fiction.25 After briefly studying medicine in
Sendai, Lu returned to Tokyo as a full-time writer, participating in nationalist Zhang Taiyan’s
anti-Qing organization, the Restoration Society, while writing essays for Chinese publications
founded in Japan.26 He left Japan for China in 1909, assumed teaching roles in higher education,
and formed bigger literary circles that promoted nationalist ideals.
Lu’s experience reflects how, reinforced by the high concentration of literate students
willing to observe and absorb modern ideas, the development of Chinese nationalist literature in
Kanda was swift and prevalent. While figures like Lu explored nationalist literary expressions,
however, other students in Kanda started seeking ways of politically improving their homeland.
Many, like Lu, arrived in Japan to study, either under their families’ or their own desire to selfimprove and advance onto a successful career, but were soon exposed to new experiences and
ideas that shifted the emphasis on their identity as students to a new emphasis on their identity as
Chinese nationals. This resulted in the growth of offshore Chinese nationalism in Kanda, as the
Chinatown became a new location for intellectual conversations and political gatherings.

The Greater Context of Offshore Chinese Nationalism
Arguably, the formation of the Kanda Chinatown back in the 1890s was already
inseparable from Chinese nationalism and the desire to better improve China as a country: when
Hirofumi Academy was founded, students arrived on Qing government funding, and returned to
China for prominent government posts. Imperial reformists like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao,
leaders of the Hundred-Day Reform of 1898, fled to Japan after their internal reforms failed, and

25
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continued to spread their political ideas through established newspapers.27 Later on, when
students like Lu Xun interacted with ideas of Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Taiyan in the 1900s, they
engaged with Chinese nationalism in a more radical form: a democratic one that focused on
overthrowing, instead of improving and preserving, the imperial regime of the Qing Dynasty.28
By the end of the 20th century’s first decade—when Lu left Japan—there were already signs of
change over time in the political ideas circulated among student communities in Kanda.
In the next decade, however, this already-changing form of student nationalism further
radicalized. It was characterized by two significant new trends: first, a rising anti-Japanese
sentiment and second, a strong curiosity and interest in emerging socialist ideas. To examine
these two trends, the greater historical context needs to be surveyed. The 1910s witnessed a
series of historical events that greatly influenced China’s international status. The first of these
was the Wuchang Uprising in 1911, which marked the collapse of the imperial Qing Dynasty,
followed by Sun Yat-sen’s founding of the Republic of China in 1912. While the idea of a
republic without a monarch was refreshing to many, the newness of the state and its internal
political conflicts also made it susceptible to foreign interference. Japan, as China’s neighboring
country, developed an increasingly aggressive attitude toward China in the 1910s and exhibited
signs of further infringement upon Chinese sovereignty: the most infamous event that occurred
in this period was the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, which granted Japan special privileges in
China during World War I.29
The signing of the Twenty-one Demands incited great animosity toward Japan and
dissatisfaction with China’s republican government among the Chinese students studying in

27
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Tokyo. The students referred to May 7, the day when Japan released an ultimatum that
eventually led to the signing of the demands, as a “memorial day for the country’s shame (guochi
jinianri),” a term they would continue to use over the next few years. Zhou Enlai wrote the
words “remembering the country’s shame (guochi jinian)” in his diary on May 7, 1918, under
the section where he usually copied excerpts from Confucian texts.30 Similarly, Wang Xitian,
whose life this essay will further explore, signed the words “memorial day for the country’s
shame” next to the date on a confirmation receipt of tuition checks addressed to the Manchurian
government on May 7, 1920, as if criticizing the ineptness of the government.31
As Sino-Japanese tensions further grew in the late 1910s, anti-Japanese nationalist
sentiments among the students at Kanda grew even stronger and more direct forms of protests
and activism arose. A representative example was the protest that followed the signing of a secret
pact that granted Japan more military agency along the Sino-Russian border, referred to as the
Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Agreement in 1918. Angered by the signing of the pact, students in
Kanda carried out a large-scale organized protest in which they stopped attending classes and
collectively left Japan to return to China; Zhou Enlai’s diary describes the organizing that went
into this protest, stating that “on May 5, various local student organizations in Tokyo met and
reached the consensus that… they would unite to face a common enemy [Japan]… and elect
student leaders to organize the collective return [of students to China].”32 The students’ return
stirred reactions from the Chinese government: the Jilin provincial government, for instance,
made an announcement on May 28 advising Jilin students in Tokyo to “stop listening to rumors
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and not give up [their] studies.”33 The mass return of students from Japan and the spread of
international news among student communities in Beijing eventually led to a series of student
protests in mainland China that culminated in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 following the
Treaty of Versailles, marking the transfer of an offshore nationalist movement to within the
borders of China.34
While there was an increasing anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese students in Tokyo,
many students were also affected by socialism, which became prevalent after the successful
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. Kashima Shigeru referred to Kanda as the “cradle of
Chinese Communism,” as news about the new Russian government were imported to Japan
before they were to China, and Kanda, with its high density of young intellectuals, soon became
a place with frequent exposure and exchanges of Bolshevik ideas.35 This, too, is reflected in
Zhou Enlai’s diary: on April 23, 1918, less than half a year after Lenin’s October Revolution,
Zhou picked up a newly published book called Russian Studies from Kanda’s Tōkyōdō
Bookstore and, after analyzing Russia’s current political factions, commented that “Russia will
now become the first experimental field in the world for building a socialist country.”36 Although
Zhou did not fully subscribe to communist and socialist ideas at this time, his analysis certainly
shows both a deep interest in those ideas and the accessibility of such ideas in the Kanda
Chinatown.
Under such circumstances, a student living in Kanda in the late 1910s was receiving a
radically different set of information and ideas from a Qing-sponsored student at Hirofumi
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Academy in the 1890s. Students in Kanda in the late 1910s perceived the Chinese identity, the
stakes for their home country, and the possibilities for China’s future in a very different way:
there was a stronger sense of a “common enemy” that mitigated internal disagreements within
China, and socialist ideas weakened the socioeconomic borders that separated the well-educated
Chinese elite—often constituting most of the students in Tokyo—from less-educated, poorer
Chinese people. This change in time would eventually lead to the students’ integration with
another emerging Chinese population in Tokyo at the time: that of the Chinese migrant workers.

II. Migrant Workers of Ōshima-machi and the Post-Earthquake Violence
The Origins of Chinese Workers in Japan and Imperial Rescript 352
The experience of migrant workers in early 20th century Tokyo was vastly different from,
yet subtly intertwined with, that of the students. Compared to the students, workers received
much more hostility, faced a more direct threat of expulsion, and suffered not only from Japan’s
anti-Chinese sentiments but also from the discrimination of fellow Chinese elite migrants. As
literacy rates of migrant workers were low, there remain hardly any sources about their
subjective experience; however, some evidence of their lives can be seen through local
newspapers and accounts of students whose activist work involved the assistance of laborers.
The earliest Chinese migrant populations to arrive near Tokyo Bay did not settle in the
city of Tokyo itself; instead, they formed communities in the treaty port of Yokohama, following
the end of Tokugawa maritime restrictions in 1854. The Yokohama Chinatown was part of the
Foreign Settlement district, since foreigners were still not granted mixed residence with Japanese
locals.37 As Japan rose as an empire on the global level toward the end of the 19th century,
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however, it decided to terminate the Foreign Settlement and allow mixed residence with
foreigners outside of treaty ports starting July 17, 1899.38 The “foreigners” discussed, however,
did not include a large proportion of Qing subjects: Chinese migrant workers.
On July 27, 1899, Japan promulgated Imperial Rescript 352, which announced that
“[Chinese] laborers without special permission from government authorities would not be
permitted to live or work outside of the Foreign Settlement or the zone of mixed residence,” as
an amendment to its new mixed residence policy.39 Imperial Rescript 352 barred Chinese
migrant workers, either already living in Japan or not yet arrived, from entering Tokyo, while
other Chinese nationals such as businessmen, students and scholars were able to live and work in
the city as they pleased. Therefore, while schools were founded in Kanda and students from
China continuously arrived in Japan, there was a long hiatus in the migration of lower-class
Chinese workers.
This division between the elite and non-elite Chinese populations was enabled not only
by the Japanese government, but also by members of the well-educated Chinese elite at the time.
When there was much debate in Japan concerning whether to grant Chinese nationals mixed
residence, prominent Chinese figures in Yokohama like Liang Qichao, former Qing official who
initiated the Hundred-Day Reform, petitioned for mixed residence by arguing how much “people
of business” differed from Chinese manual laborers, who were regarded as avaricious, unclean,
and ought to be excluded in Japan as much as they were in the United States and Australia.40 In
his political newspaper, The China Discussion, Liang published an article in July 1899 that
argued how Chinese merchants’ activities might boost the Japanese economy, and how the
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empire could use the capital its neighboring country’s elites.41 Manual laborers, Liang argues,
were uneducated, unsanitary, and asked for wages so low that they harmed the Japanese labor
market’s balance; “people of business,” however, did not possess any of the qualities that
excluded them from the right of mixed residence.42 Therefore, he argued Japan needed to
exclude only Chinese migrant workers.
In keeping with this kind of thinking, the promulgated rescript classified Chinese migrant
populations in the country, specifying “laborers” as needing special permission to be granted
mixed residence, whereas rich “merchants” automatically obtained mixed residence in
Yokohama, Tokyo and beyond. The rules set by this rescript, however, underwent a series of
challenges in the first two decades of the 20th century, especially after the country transitioned
into the Taishō Period after the Meiji Emperor’s death. Japanese politics in this period was
characterized by a combination of relaxed government surveillance and domestic social protests;
historian Andrew Gordon describes Japan as undergoing a transition from “imperial
bureaucracy” to “imperial democracy,” where a political order formerly established by oligarchs
was replaced by more liberal political structures that granted workers and farmers more agency.43
This new agency was reflected among not only domestic workers but also foreign ones: with
weaker government control over immigration, the previous line between merchants and laborers
was blurred, and Chinese migrant workers communities started to form in Tokyo, taking
advantage of the flaws in Imperial Rescript 352: groups started entering the country as
merchants, but stayed as manual laborers.
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Migrant Workers in Tokyo Managed by the Empire
Beginning in 1919, there was an influx of merchants from the province of Zhejiang on
China’s east coast to Japan. Prompted by the decline in European trading opportunities following
World War I, a man from Chuzhou, a city in Zhejiang, first brought stoneware to Japan for sale;
then, a man from the neighboring city of Wenzhou made a fortune out of selling umbrellas. With
news of sales opportunities traveling between social networks in Zhejiang, groups of Wenzhou
and Chuzhou merchants, as well as a smaller portion from the northern province of Shandong,
traveled to Japan with umbrellas and other artifacts, hoping to make a fortune: their destinations
included Nagasaki, Moji, Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya, Tokyo, and Hokkaido (Fig. 1).44

Fig. 1. Migration patterns of Chinese merchants to Japan in the early Taishō Period.
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While many merchants still traveled to treaty ports with established Chinese
communities, many others also traveled to major cities like Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka, as their
identity as merchants allowed them the status of mixed residence. It is estimated that from the
winter of 1920 to the spring of 1922, more than 3500 merchants from Wenzhou and Chuzhou
lived in Japan.45 However, as stocks of their goods ran out, they looked for other means of living.
Many were recruited by Japanese factory owners to conduct manual labor in ironwork,
woodwork, glasswork, pencil-making, pen-making, or weaving.
As more news about job opportunities in Japan spread through local social networks in
Wenzhou and Chuzhou, more left for Japan to do manual labor. By 1923, the number of Chinese
migrant workers in Japan was over 7000.46 Many of them lived in Tokyo: it was estimated that in
this year there were around 4500 Chinese in Tokyo, and around 2000 were migrant workers.47
Given that a series of mass deportations—which this thesis will later discuss in depth—happened
a year before the estimate was made, the actual number of Chinese workers who entered Tokyo
over the course of four years was even greater. Most migrant workers received minimum wage
and were living in clustered dorms with poor living and sanitary conditions. Two recorded
clusters of Chinese workers lived respectively on the eastern and northeastern side of Tokyo,
away from the city’s center, near the Edogawa River. Compared to the proximity of Kanda to
Tokyo’s city center, the detachment of the workers’ communities from city life in Tokyo and the
stark contrast between the student and worker groups’ residence locations is apparent (Fig. 2).
This divide fits with the general geography of working-class communities in Tokyo, and
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suggests that Chinese experiences in Tokyo at this time were divided by class instead of by
ethnicity at least to some extent.

Fig. 2. Chinese population clusters in Tokyo around 1920.
Initially, there was little response from the Japanese government to the growing Chinese
manual laborer population. As the number of Chinese migrant workers in major Japanese cities
accumulated, however, local governments and police forces that had been previously oblivious
felt the need to manage them. The previous relaxation of surveillance allowed Chinese nationals
to arrive in Japanese cities as merchants but live as migrant workers. Therefore, authorities in
turn used the same tool that allowed them in to drive them out: Imperial Rescript 352. In August
1922, Tokyo started a series of actions against Chinese manual laborers.48
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On August 12, 1922, eighty-two Chinese migrant workers in the neighborhood of
Minami-Senju, on the northeastern side of Tokyo, had their homes inspected by the police. The
inspections revealed that they did not hold special permission for mixed residence; the workers
were warned that according to Imperial Rescript 352, if they could not obtain permissions they
would be deported by force.49 Both the Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun newspapers
reported this event, and identified the laborers to be deported as Chinese nationals from
Wenzhou who first arrived in Japan as clothing and umbrella merchants. “Many arrived a year
ago, selling sweets, umbrellas, medicine and fans, but as their goods could not sell they recently
became manual laborers,” Asahi reported. “At least 300 live in the jurisdictions of the Senju
Police Office, and there are 30 people living in the same house with only 30 sen to spare a day,
causing a hygiene hazard.”50 The news report then quotes Chief Takefuji of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department’s Foreign Affairs Section: “the Chinese workers live unsanitary
lives and gamble all day and night, and are disruptive in terms of hygiene, behavior and
language; therefore those corrupted individuals need to be gathered and sent back to their own
country.”51
The Metropolitan Police Department then targeted the Chinese communities in Kameido
and Ōshima-machi, where more workers resided. On August 17, “around two hundred and fifty
to sixty Chinamen conducting lower-class labor work were ordered to be deported.”52 Around
the same time, eighteen Chinese workers in a woodwork factory in Fukagawa district were not
granted special permission to stay as technical workers and were deported.53 The reasons given
49
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for deportation, aside from the official Imperial Rescript 352, were usually lack of hygiene and
“proper behavior.”54 A desire to sanitize the empire is reflected through the deportations: as the
state exercises authority over its local populations, it expels the factors that disturbed the city’s
hygiene and the empire’s image. This desire to connect the health of the individual to the health
of the empire was a recurring theme in imperial Japan, and can be reflected in the empire’s
sanitization of other colonial spaces with foreign populations, such as the treaty port of Tianjin as
studied by Ruth Rogaski in her book Hygienic Modernity.55
Those attempts at managing the population did not go without a response. In fact, as a
response, local populations started self-managing to better comply with guidelines presented by
the empire. The deportations in 1922 triggered a series of movements and self-regulations
responding to the issue of hygiene targeted by the Japanese government in local Chinese
communities, many supported by the well-educated Chinese community. Unlike in 1899, when
the non-laborer Chinese populations sought to distinguish themselves from the laborer
populations, in 1922 the non-laborer population—students in particular—exhibited a strong
sense of solidarity with the workers. The new nationalist and socialist ideas that influenced the
students in the 1910s contributed directly to the establishment of this sense of solidarity: as
students saw themselves less as a special class of “Chinese elite” and more as members of a
persecuted nation, they became more concerned by the inequalities and injustices their workingclass compatriots faced.
On August 19, two days after the mass deportations at Ōshima-machi, the Yomiuri
reported that a group of local Chinese students had gathered at the Chinese Students’ Hall at
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Kanda with representatives from labor parties in Japan, before heading off to the Metropolitan
Police Department to appeal for the Chinese migrant workers and try to obtain permission for
them to stay in Japan.56 Two other Chinese students led another group that protested inhumane
investigations by the police, after police officers stripped Chinese workers for physical
examination.57 Despite mostly coming from prominent families in China, having been granted
mixed residence, and belonging to the “Chinese elite” represented by figures like Liang Qichao
in the previous decades, many students, out of leftist and humanist ideas, felt a need to help with
the situation of migrant workers.
On the one hand, those activist actions exhibited the agency of the Chinese population in
Tokyo and their ability to adjust and respond to imperial requests from the Japanese government,
indicating that they were not merely subject to absolute power in the empire. Yet on the other
hand, the fact that local populations must comply with the rules set by the empire in order to
maintain their status reflects their lack of agency; the fact that workers were not able to organize
movements against the deportations themselves and had to rely on the more well-educated, more
elite student population indicates the huge power difference not only defined by nationality, but
also defined by class. Nonetheless, despite this gap, the students’ activism still shows how a new
Chinese national consciousness has enabled solidarity between Chinese populations of various
classes, merging dichotomized experiences in the empire’s core.

The Ōshima-machi Incident
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Following the student activism and internal reforms within the Chinese communities, the
migrant worker communities seemingly existed in Tokyo in peace for about a year, their living
conditions improving. However, the tension that existed between the authorities and those
migrant populations did not disappear: under the surface, xenophobia simmered. The Chinese
population, especially the migrant worker population, was still perceived as a foreign, backward,
and unpopular entity by Japan. In a little over a year after the deportations, an earthquake saw the
underlying tensions explode into conflict and violence.
On September 1, 1923, an earthquake registering around 7.9 on the Richter scale—later
known as the Great Kantō Earthquake—struck eastern Japan. In Tokyo, 58,104 died and over
10,000 went missing, while roughly 48 percent of families had their homes destroyed.58 Riots
and violence ensued after the earthquake, the most infamous of which being the killing of
thousands of Koreans under rumors of them committing arson and rape: historian Michael
Weiner describes the local massacres as enabled by government authorities and martial laws.59
Martial law authorities also transported and detained over twenty thousand Koreans in the month
of September.60 It is generally agreed among historians that three major massacres and
assassinations happened right after the earthquake: the massacre of Koreans, the killing of ten
Japanese labor union leaders in Kameido, and the assassination of anarchists Ōsugi Sakae and Itō
Noe as well as Ōsugi’s nephew.61 All three incidents reflect that authority at the time desired to
further cleanse the empire of factors threatening the purity and stability of Japanese society.
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There is, however, one more incident rarely examined by historians: the massacre at Ōshimamachi of Chinese migrant workers.
The exact number of Chinese workers killed at Ōshima-machi remains uncertain, but
according to historian Tahara Yō, police documents indicated the deaths of about 320~330
Chinese residents who were posthumously “confirmed as Koreans.”62 The actual number of total
killings was higher: according to historian Seiichi Imai, among the estimated 6000 “Koreans”
killed in Tokyo after the earthquake, more than 600 were Chinese; around 500 were killed in the
vicinities of Ōshima-machi.63 While many perpetrators of the violence were local vigilante corps
that consisted of young Japanese civilians, there was also a strong military presence. The diary of
a low-rank Japanese soldier named Kubono Shigeji provides some of the most detailed first-hand
descriptions of the military’s involvement in the massacre.
According to Kubono, the soldiers set out from their camps in the direction of Kameido
and Komatsu River on September 2, with the initial purpose of “saving lives of people… in the
sea of fire.”64 On September 3, however, they received the order that there were Korean people
poisoning wells, setting fire to houses, and raping local women; as a response, the soldiers
marched to Ōshima-machi with guns, Japanese swords, and bamboo spears, killing “Koreans”
before throwing their bodies into the river.65 Kubono’s diary does not identify any victims of the
massacre as Chinese; since he also recorded that the troops “sending more than a thousand and
two hundred Chinese and Koreans to the city of Narashino” for containment purposes, it is likely
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that he believed that the troops only killed Koreans.66 On September 29, Kubono heard from a
fellow soldier that “around 200 Korean laborers” were killed.67
However, despite the lack of identification of the victims as Chinese in Kubono’s diary,
Japanese officials were aware that not everyone killed was Korean. An internal account from the
Tokyo Metropolitan Police dated September 6, 1923, used the word shisenjin, meaning “Chinese
and Koreans,” to describe the victims of the killings by military forces and vigilant corps.68
While the killing of Koreans were more easily publicized, there was an active effort from
Japanese officials to censor information that identified the victims as Chinese in the next few
months. On November 7, following a series of questions and investigations from the Chinese
side, an article titled “Atrocities toward the Chinese (shinajin saigan jiken)” that revealed the
killing of “more than three hundred Chinese… killed near the workers’ dorms at Ōshima-machi
from September 5th to 9th” was scheduled to be published in the Yomiuri.69 The publication,
however, was banned by the government, following a cabinet meeting that decided to conceal the
truth of the massacre.70 Later on, on December 8, a group of cabinet ministers and high-rank
government officials met and prepared an official testimony that attributed most of the Chinese
casualties to the earthquake itself instead of murder, and designed ambiguous answers regarding
the identity of the perpetrators of “mistaken killings.”71
It is evident that Japan, throughout the months following the Ōshima-machi massacre,
attempted to conceal the truth under a fear that it would further cause anti-Japanese sentiments
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among the Chinese and serious foreign affairs repercussions. In the year following the
earthquake, the Republic of China sent groups of investigators following informal news that
hundreds of Chinese were killed in Tokyo. A Japanese diplomat in China name Nishida Koichi
compiled a report on January 11, 1924, regarding a trip to Japan by Chinese governmentsponsored investigators: Nishida advised that the Japanese government ought to “not let this
event trigger worse tensions between China and Japan,” and noted that the killings at Ōshimamachi could be framed as “an emergency response given the situation of the earthquake, which
leaves room for nuanced negotiations.”72 However, Nishida identified another incident as less
negotiable for the Chinese: the killing of Wang Xitian presented at the beginning of this essay,
which, “compared to the Ōshima-machi killings, [the Chinese investigators] cared more about.”73
His report implies that Wang’s death resulted from the same causes that led to the massacre of
workers at Ōshima-machi, while his social and educational status set his importance apart from
the workers. This, of course, suggests that nation had not, in fact, completely overshadowed
class, but it also raises the question of Wang’s connection to his working-class compatriots. In
order to address this question and fully evaluate the significance of his death, Wang’s life leading
up to 1923 needs to be examined in depth.

III. The Life and Death of Activist Wang Xitian
Wang Xitian as a Student in Tokyo
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Wang Xitian was born in 1896 in Changchun, a town in Jilin Province, Manchuria, to an
affluent mine owner’s family.74 He was enrolled in Jilin Provincial High School in 1912 under
his former name Wang Xijing, and started studying in Japan in 1914, attending language school;
he was first listed as a student at Kanda’s Seisaku Preparatory School and then at Kanda’s East
Asia High school (which Zhou Enlai later attended) in the provincial survey forms.75 A
provincial record dated September 28, 1916 identifies him as a “student studying in Tokyo at his
own expense (liudong zifeisheng)”.76
In November, 1916, Wang was listed—along with eight other students—as a candidate
for Changchun’s local scholarship (xianfei), after the disqualification of two former scholarship
recipients; it is unclear whether he received said scholarship.77 However, in the subsequent year,
with his admission into Tokyo’s First Higher School—the preparatory school often seen as
Tokyo University’s biggest feeder school, and one of the two schools whose entrance exams
Zhou Enlai failed in 1918—Wang was qualified for and started receiving Jilin’s provincial
scholarship (shengfei).78 His time at First Higher School started in September, 1917, and he
would remain a registered student there until May, 1919.79
Wang’s two years at First Higher School were also the two years when his life in Tokyo
overlapped with Zhou Enlai’s. Zhou’s diary recorded nine visits to his place by Wang—and
often with other friends—within the first four months of 1918, on January 6, February 25, March
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10, March 16, March 29, April 4, April 5, April 8, and April 20 respectively.80 The visits were
often recorded as followed by long talks or dinner with a group of friends. In an interview in
1961, Zhou described him and Wang as being “on very good terms.”81
Zhou also described Wang as a “devout Christian.”82 In the booklet Brief History on
Wang Xitian’s Life compiled by Xie Jiemei, Wang’s other close friend in Tokyo, Wang’s
conversion to Christianity was attributed to the influence of his friends in Tokyo.83 According to
Xie, Wang was a frequent smoker and drinker back in Jilin; however, after coming to Tokyo, “as
all his friends were moral and pure… he naturally corrected all bad habits in the past.”84 Then,
after attending multiple religious gatherings at the Tokyo Chinese YMCA in Kanda, Wang
converted to Christianity in 1916, quit smoking and drinking, and remained involved with
YMCA-related activities for the rest of his life, even becoming a YMCA officer and establishing
a new location for the organization on the second floor of a chapel on Kanda’s Hill of Kudan.85
Christianity was one of the two vital factors that defined Wang’s experience as a student in
Tokyo; the other was nationalism.

Wang’s Life as a Nationalist and Activist
As formerly discussed, the internal and external pressures in China following the collapse
of the Qing Dynasty and the series of military threats posed by Japan exacerbated Sino-Japan
relationships in the 1910s, and among the Chinese students of Tokyo, a strong nationalist
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sentiment arose. Wang was a prominent nationalist figure in the Chinese student community;
according to Xie Jiemei, there were often nationalist student meetings held to discuss the future
of China and how to make the country stronger, and “whenever there was a meeting, [Wang]
would always attend.”86
In early April, 1918, following the spread of news regarding the secret signing of the
Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Agreement, Wang made a speech to a group of students, arguing
that “there is no use in studying when our country is no longer going to be a country; the only
plan for any student is to quit school in Japan and fight for the cancellation of the pact.”87 A
subsequent gathering at a restaurant called Genjunkan in Kanda was held to discuss details of
this plan and solicit consensus from all regional Chinese students’ associations; the meeting was
halted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, and several students leaders, including Wang Xitian,
were detained for a day.88 The exact date of this gathering is unclear: Xie recounts it as being “a
day in April,” but Zhou Enlai’s diary does not start recording student gatherings and discussions
about returning to China until May 2. Zhou mentions a “collective meeting of all regional student
associations” on the evening of May 4, which, given the temporal accuracy of diaries, is possibly
the actual date when Wang was detained.89 There was, however, no mention of the detention in
Zhou’s diary; the cause of this missing information might have been Zhou’s disapproval of this
activity, as he indicated that he, desiring to stay in Japan and continue his studies, “passively
opposed the proposal to return to China and said nothing [at the local students’ gathering].”90
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Despite the meeting reaching a consensus on returning to China, not all Chinese students
chose to do so, and not all chose to do so immediately. Wang Xitian, however, set off to China
immediately to spread the news about the secret pacts to students in Beijing: he departed on May
7 from Yokohama, and Zhou Enlai recorded in his diary that he “met Xitian and several others
around noon and saw them off to Yokohama.”91 Ironically, Wang received the tuition checks for
June from the Jilin government on May 5, two days prior to his departure: he still confirmed the
reception of the check, but, when signing the receipt, purposefully left the “address in Tokyo”
section blank.92
Documents from the Jilin government indicate that among all Jilin students studying in
Japan, only two students returned to China following the meeting, Wang being one of them.93 In
the same document, the government announced that all students who returned to China would
stop receiving government funding; if they still did not return to Tokyo in the fall, their
scholarship would be terminated as well as their student status.94 Presumably it was under this
pressure that Wang returned to Japan in the fall. Although Xie’s account states that he did not
return to Japan until the winter, Wang’s date of return was recorded as September 4 in official
reports.95
Wang was, however, extremely unhappy with the situation in Tokyo and sought ways to
no longer study in Japan. Judging from the receipts of his tuition checks, he lived in Tokyo until
the summer of 1919, with his last Tokyo address listed as “the Kanda Chinese YMCA” on June
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27.96 On the September check, however, the address became “Nagoya.”97 Wang had transferred
to Nagoya’s Eighth Higher School.98 There he majored in French and German Studies, and soon
began seeking ways of studying abroad in European countries in order to leave Japan.
On October 4, 1920, Wang sent a letter to the Jilin Ministry of Education, petitioning to
transfer his scholarship in Japan to Germany; he explained that he transferred to Eighth Higher
School to study German and French politics and economics, and that since his German had
improved enough for attending lectures taught fully in German and the German currency has
dropped in value, he wished to, “using the same price, study German knowledge in Germany
instead of studying a replicated version in Japan.”99 The Ministry, however, turned down Wang’s
request at the end of the month, as “there was no precedent of transferring from a Japanese
institution to a western one.”100 A few rounds of petitions ensued in the following year but to no
avail, as the Jilin government was unwilling to spend more money on the transfer process;
Wang’s plan to study in Germany was eventually aborted. In February of 1920, Wang was also
diagnosed with tuberculosis. As a result of the severity of the disease combined with the
impossibility to study in Europe with his degree, Wang stopped attending school in the spring of
1921.101
Stopping his studies at Eighth Higher School marked the end of Wang’s life as a student;
he spent half a year on the coast of Nagaoka recovering from tuberculosis, before returning to
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Tokyo in the fall of 1921. Upon his return to Tokyo, Wang officially terminated his government
scholarship under the pretext of “severe illness.”102 He became no longer a student, but a fulltime activist: he first started working for the Kanda YMCA, assisting both students and manual
laborers associated with the organization.103
This transition also marked the shift of Wang’s activist work: while he focused on antiJapanese nationalistic protests among students, Wang also started to unite student populations
with migrant workers after moving back to Tokyo, emphasizing the formation of a shared
nationalistic identity purely by ethnicity. When Wang was studying in both Tokyo and Nagoya,
he had already observed seeing the difficult living situation of Chinese workers in both
locations.104 After moving back to Tokyo, he started the most significant project of his life: the
Mutual Aid Association.

The Founding of the Mutual Aid Association
The origins of the Mutual Aid Association can be traced back to Wang Xitian’s time in
Nagoya, when he started discussing with his friend and fellow Chinese student, Wang
Zhaocheng, about ways to improve the workers’ lives.105 When Wang Xitian returned to Tokyo
to commence his work at the Kanda YMCA, Wang Zhaocheng, still attending the Eighth Higher
School, ran a pilot residential program named “Mutual Aid Dorm (Gongjihao)” for the workers
in Nagoya, and lived with them in order to assist them.106 Wang Xitian and Wang Zhaocheng
then proposed plans for improving the workers’ lives at student conferences held in Hakone and
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Ōhara in June and July of 1922, calling students’ attention to the hardships migrant workers were
undergoing. Japanese social activists, such as Pastor Yamamuro Gunpei from the Salvation
Army, also attended these meetings.107
The proposals might have remained theoretical, had the mass deportations of Chinese
migrant workers from Tokyo in 1922 not happened directly following the two conferences. As
an instant response to the deportations in Tokyo as well as a continued effort since Wang’s
Nagoya days, the Mutual Aid Association of Chinese Workers in Japan (Qiaori Gongjihui) was
officially founded. The Mutual Aid Association was based in Ōshima-machi, where the Chinese
worker population was the most concentrated, and Wang also established there communal dorms
for Chinese workers in order to help “improve their lives and counter the suppression from the
Japanese.”108
In order to prevent more deportations under the pretext of improper behavior and lack of
hygiene, Wang designed a set of rules in the lodging houses that regulated Chinese workers’
lifestyles: banning the use of Opium and gambling in the residence, requiring daily cleaning of
the rooms, and allowing no more than one person per mat when sleeping.109 Regarding the issue
of hygiene, specifically, Wang hired a doctor friend of his, Sun Shaotang, to investigate the
sanitary conditions of worker residents and investigate the cause of diseases and set up a health
station for the Chinese workers.110 Wang also held daily Japanese classes for workers in Ōshimamachi.111 This educational effort indicates Wang’s desire to help the workers not only avoid
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deportation by the direct issue of hygiene, but also gain more agency through mastering the
Japanese language.
On December 1, 1922, Wang resigned from his job at the Kanda Chinese YMCA. In his
resignation letter, Wang stated that he “was obliged to work at the Mutual Aid Association for
the two to three thousands of fellow countrymen who came to Japan, and could not handle the
obligation simultaneously with his tasks at the YMCA; and therefore [is] fully dissociating
himself from the YMCA starting December 1, 1922, and offer [his] full service to the Mutual
Aid Association founded for the fellow countrymen doing manual labor.”112 In 1923, Wang’s
official registered address in Chinese government records has become one in Ōshima-machi,
very possibly the Mutual Aid Association office.113 If the former termination of his governmentsponsored scholarship marks Wang’s transition from a student to a full-time activist, then his
resignation from the YMCA marks a more specific career transition for Wang, one defined by
his full dedication to the cause of improving manual laborers’ lives, a cause that blurs the
preexisting socioeconomic borders that set students apart from migrant workers and reunites the
two different Chinese identities in Tokyo under common ethnicity.
The specific work Wang conducted also reflects his aspiration: unifying the migrant
workers with the students and having both populations accepted into the Empire of Japan’s
society. His reforms were mainly an immediate response to Japanese attempts at purging the
Chinese migrant workers from the core of the empire: his focus on hygiene, morality and
education reflect the attempt to make Chinese workers no longer seem like “Others” in the
empire. This aspiration also brought dangers: as Wang’s work countered not only anti-Chinese
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sentiments but also anti-laborer sentiments, he was in close contact with like-minded Japanese
socialist activists at the time, which led to the police’s suspicions that he was involved with
anarchist groups that sought to topple the order established by the government.114 As early as
April, 1922, when Wang was still working at the Kanda YMCA, the police was already
monitoring his activities at student gatherings, seeking “suspicious signs.”115 Later, when the
Mutual Aid Association was founded, Wang’s actions were further monitored by the police, as
he was marked as a “Chinese to pay attention to (yōchūi chūgokujin)” in official documents.116
As surveillance and tension accumulated with Wang’s increased activism, conflict between the
authority and the activists inevitably occurred, culminating in his murder at Sakai Bridge
following the massacre at Ōshima-machi.

The Murder at Sakai Bridge: Causes and Consequences
When the Great Kantō Earthquake and the massacre at Ōshima-machi happened, the
Mutual Aid Association was still a young organization, having existed for only slightly over a
year. As Ōshima-machi was far from the city center and traffic was cut off during the
earthquake, leaders of the Mutual Aid Association—who were mostly students living in districts
like Kanda and Waseda, closer to the center of Tokyo—knew very little about what happened to
the migrant workers. But on September 9, Wang Xitian, concerned about the condition of
workers, traveled to Ōshima-machi on a bicycle. He never returned. On the morning of
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September 12, Wang was secretly executed by Kakiuchi Yasuo under Sakai Bridge, operating
under Sasaki Heikichi’s demand of “getting rid of one man.”117
In his oral historical testimony to Tahara Yō, Kakiuchi confessed that he did not know
why Wang was executed; he received the order from Sasaki, and assumed that Sasaki “received
orders from higher up as well.”118 Kakiuchi did not realize how prominent a figure in the Tokyo
Chinese community Wang was until later; however, when he received the order to execute
Wang, he felt that it was an honorable task that would show to his supervisors his skills as a
swordsman. A close friend of his in the army boasted about “finishing off 200 [Koreans and
Chinese] at Ōshima-machi on September 3,” and Kakiuchi admitted that he felt jealous and
hoped for a similar opportunity where he could “discipline the Koreans and Chinese,” without
considering whether the Chinese man he was ordered to kill had actually committed any crime
that made him deserve death.119 The secrecy of Wang’s identity was well-maintained even to the
lower-rank Japanese soldiers. In his diary, Kubono, who participated in the Ōshima massacre,
also states that he did not know about the murder until reading about Wang’s missing in the
October 18 Yomiuri and subsequently hearing about it from a sentry: “They mutilated Wang’s
face and limbs, burned his clothes, and took away the 10.7 yen as well as a pen he carried; the
killing became a secret among the officers.”120
Japan continued to conceal and censor news about Wang’s death afterwards, preparing
official statements that claimed that Wang was released by the army before he went missing.
Given Wang’s status, the censorship process operated at a very high level in the government. At
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a meeting on October 13, 1923, the post-earthquake Martial Law Enforcement Committee
crafted an “official statement” whose editorial process involved four ministers in the cabinet. The
testimony goes as follows: Wang was among the Chinese escorted to Narashino on September
11, and Sasaki, responsible for the escort, heard the news that Wang was “a leader of the antiJapanese Chinese and ought to be paid extra attention to.”121 Therefore, fearing that Wang would
incite anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese at Narashino, Sasaki asked the Kameido
Police to detain Wang temporarily and later took him back and questioned him; after the
questioning Sasaki decided Wang was “not a dangerous person after all” and released him,
watching him head toward Komatsu River.122
This narrative would continuously be revised and repeated over the next months and
years, as the Chinese government sent out official inquiries and even investigators to “look into
the truth behind the mistaken killing of Chinese after the earthquake.”123 The investigators met
with Japan’s Minister of War and the Chief of Tokyo Metropolitan Police on November 29,
1923, where the official narrative was told once more: that Wang was questioned and released by
Sasaki, when the latter realized that he was “well-educated and spoke good Japanese, and had no
need to be contained in Narashino like the manual laborers.”124 Interestingly enough, the reasons
presented for the feigned release of Wang was that he belonged to an “elite class” different from
the migrant workers, seemingly reflecting a continued divide between the way students and
workers were treated in Tokyo; in fact, however, Wang’s activism had made him as dangerous
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as, or even more dangerous than, the migrant workers threatening the stability of the empire, and
made his execution a necessity.
While the Japanese government continued to suppress news about what happened to
Wang and didn’t confirm his death in public until after World War II, Wang’s fate was inferred
by his friends and fellow leaders of the Mutual Aid Association. A few years later, Wang’s
friend from his Nagoya days and Vice President of the Mutual Aid Association, Wang
Zhaocheng, analyzed seven reasons for his death: “that he was a Chinese man opposing Japanese
authority, a close friend of Japanese socialists, and an honest and straightforward man; that he
founded the Mutual Aid Association, certain Japanese people hated him, the earthquake
happened, and he witnessed the massacre at Ōshima-machi.”125 Wang Zhaocheng also analyzed
the reasons for the killings of Chinese migrant workers: xenophobia in Japan and the fact that
Chinese workers were asking for much lower wages and causing an imbalance in the Japanese
labor market.126
Wang Zhaocheng’s analyses are surely accurate; but in addition, the killings also reflect
another phenomenon in Tokyo directly after the earthquake. In a time of destruction, the empire
sought stability and manageability. While there was national anxiety and hostility toward foreign
workers, the fact that both workers and members of the elite class like Wang faced violence—
Wang Zhaocheng himself, for instance, was injured by the police and soon deported under
suspicions of espionage—reflects that at a time of crisis, after the earthquake, socioeconomic
boundaries were blurred and only national boundaries were emphasized.127 In fact, even national
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boundaries were blurred: the Japanese authority followed a new “imperial boundary” that
distinguished those belonging to the empire from those who did not.
The most evident example is the connection between the purging of foreigners to the
purging of socialists after the earthquake. Michael Weiner, when discussing the massacre of
Koreans after the earthquake, argues that the Japanese government made a conscious effort to
link the image of dissident Koreans to the image of radical Japanese socialists.128 The
assassination of Japanese radicals Ōsugi Sakae and Itō Noe occurred less than two weeks
following the massacre of Chinese and Koreans, and was attributed to by Tahara Yō as part of
the empire’s same regulatory effort.129 Wang Xitian, too, because of his fluency in Japanese, was
in close contact with many Japanese socialists, mostly Christian social activists: besides
Yamamuro Gunpei, who participated in the founding of Mutual Aid Association, Wang’s closest
Japanese friends include peace activist Kagawa Toyohiko, Christian scientist Satō Sadakichi, and
socialist author Okino Iwasaburo.130 Those connections further resulted in the Japanese
government’s suspicions of his activities, and accelerated their extermination of him. Despite
being of different ethnicities and nationalities, Chinese migrant workers, activists like Wang,
Japanese labor union leaders, and anarchists like Ōsugi all disrupted the imperial order to some
extent: the asking for lower wages disrupted the preexisting labor market balance, and the
activism disrupted the preexisting social order established through classification. Therefore, all
of them became “Others,” those who did not belong in the empire, and were therefore to be
exterminated when the empire was at its most vulnerable state after the earthquake.
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IV. The “Chinese Experience”: Simultaneous Marginalization and Unification in Tokyo
The Empire’s Attitude: From Classification to Elimination
Having discussed the experience of students in Kanda, of migrant workers in Ōshimamachi, and of Wang Xitian, whose life intersected with both experiences, the question arises:
how should the Chinese experience in Tokyo in the early 20th century be summarized? To
answer this question, two aspects need to be examined: the Empire of Japan’s actions towards
the Chinese population, and the agency and attitude of Chinese residents themselves. In both
cases there can be seen a change over time, a transition from separated experiences to a unified
experience.
From the Empire of Japan’s perspective, various actions were taken to manage the
Chinese in Tokyo. Imperial Rescript 352, which excluded Chinese workers from the empire’s
core, and the establishment of Hirofumi Academy, which welcomed wealthy elite Chinese
nationals to pursue higher education, occurred around the same time at the turn of the century.
This stark contrast in expulsion and reception reflects Japan’s desire to classify its residents and
maintain a homogeneous category of well-educated residents who spoke the Japanese language,
contributed to the growth of national economy, and assisted the empire’s image-building.
Japan, however, never truly accepted even the elite members of the Chinese community
as part of the empire. While the empire’s peaceful façade of acceptance and coexistence with the
Chinese elite could be maintained under normal circumstances, events such as the detention of
students following the protests in 1918 and the subsequent surveillance, imprisonment and even
murder of student activists reflect how quickly the empire was able to identify members of the
elite as threats to the stability of the state. In 1923, when the earthquake occurred, both migrant
workers and activists were contained, deported, and killed. In Japanese government documents
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that discussed Wang Xitian’s death, there was an emphasis on the perception of Wang as an
“prominent anti-Japanese leader” who threatened social stability and incited anti-Japanese
sentiments among local Chinese populations.131 Wang’s work, on the other hand, merely
involved the improvement of workers’ lives and the securing of workers’ basic rights. However,
as he attempted to unify the formerly classified Chinese nationals and act as the well-educated
agent for the exploited manual laborers, he was seen as a disruptive force to the empire and
therefore eliminated.
There were recurring themes in Japan’s treatment of its Chinese migrant populations that
reflected anxieties within the empire: the maintaining of a westernized national image, the state
control over hygiene, and the fear of unrest and uprisings, especially in times of great social
instability. The empire was not only purging physical disturbances such as the lack of hygiene
and “morality,” but also political and ideological disturbances such as anarchism and socialism
from its system through violence, which can be inferred through the assassinations of radical
Japanese nationals around the same time as Wang’s death.
It is also worth noting that Japan’s marginalization and control of its Chinese populations
was not without constraints; the empire’s relation with China on a country-to-country level still
prevent Japan from exercising absolute power over its Chinese populations. Most violence
occurred on a local level, such as the attack on Ōshima-machi by vigilante corps. The state, on
the other hand, maintained a diplomatic image and attempted to preserve a peaceful diplomatic
appearance through the concealing of truths; it even sought to separate itself from the local
perpetrators of violence. The Head of Tokyo Metropolitan Police even sent police forces to
Ōshima-machi in October 1923, “pretending to investigate the truth and severely punishing those
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who killed the Chinese, therefore causing panic among the soldiers and young vigilante corps in
the region and denying the state’s association with the incident.”132 While it was the empire’s
desire to manage its population and purge the disturbances, its absolute power was also checked
by the foreign affairs pressure on an international level.

Changes within the Chinese Population: The Formation of a New National Identity
There was also much change in the attitude of Chinese residents toward their own
countrymen over time. In the 1890s, Chinese elites like Liang Qichao played along with Japan’s
ideas of classification, even assisting Japan’s actions. Liang was very much a Chinese
nationalist, and his efforts to help Chinese merchants obtain status of mixed residence reflected a
certain solidarity among Chinese nationals; however, his nationalism was a selective, elite
nationalism, and the solidarity was restricted to among members of higher socioeconomic
standing. It was under such ideas that mixed residence for Chinese merchants and students were
granted, and Imperial Rescript 352 promulgated; the Kanda Chinatown was founded upon such
early ideas of selective nationalism.
However, as the international political landscape shifted in the early 20th century and new
ideas continually reached the Chinese populations in Tokyo, Chinese nationalism there started
taking a different form. By the time the migrant workers from Wenzhou and Chuzhou, taking
advantage of the loopholes of Imperial Rescript 352, arrived in Tokyo, the intellectual landscape
among Chinese elites in Tokyo was already vastly different. The Ōshima-machi migrant worker
community was a very new one compared to the Kanda Chinatown community; during the two
decades between the formation of the two communities, the combination of stronger anti-
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Japanese sentiments and socialist ideas sculpted a new form of Chinese nationalism that was
more ethnicity-based and less about socioeconomic standing. There was both more intellectual
exchanges, as indicated by the formation of nationalist literary circles, and more political
activism, as indicated by the student organizations’ engagement in international politics and the
anti-Japanese protests following unequal treaties. It was under such contexts that figures like
Wang Xitian emerged, acting as bridges between the two formerly dichotomized Chinese
experiences.
Wang Xitian was unique in some ways, as he was extremely radical and one of the first
Chinese students to officially attempt adapting the migrant workers into a more normalized,
mainstream Japanese life. However, he was also not entirely unique: many other students shared
his sentiments to different degrees. When the Mutual Aid Association was founded, there were
twenty officers other than Wang, all of whom were Chinese students in Tokyo.133 When the
Ōshima-machi massacre happened, eight other students—including Wang Zhaocheng—were
“identified as Koreans” and injured by the vigilante corps. Although there was no clear
indication if all the students attacked were directly involved in the Mutual Aid Association’s
work, it is likely that they were targeted since the vigilante corps, despite seeing their proofs of
identity as Chinese students, still insisted that they were Korean and attacked them.134 Even
among students who did not share Wang’s radical activism and the violent treatment he received,
there was still a strong sentiment of sympathy toward migrant workers: Zhou Enlai, whose
political stance as a student in Tokyo was so mild that he wasn’t even willing to return to China
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following the 1918 protests, recounted discussing ways to improve the lives of Chinese workers
in coal mines with Wang Xitian and Wang Pushan.135
It is particularly interesting that Zhou, whose ties to socialism and communism were not
so evident when he was a student in the Kanda Chinatown, got fully involved with the activism
in mainland China following the May Fourth Movement and subscribed to communism, later
becoming one of the key figures in the newly formed Chinese Communist Party. His experience
suggests a radicalization in the transmitting of nationalist ideas from Japan to China: as offshore
nationalism became local and more populations were motivated by the same ideas, students like
Zhou also developed more radical political ideas. Nonetheless, those ideas originated from
Zhou’s time in Tokyo; the Kanda Chinatown, as a key location for the development of Chinese
intellectual networks, played a vital role in the formation of a new Chinese nationalism that was
closely related to socialist ideas, and contributed to the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party.

What happened to the Chinese in Tokyo after 1923?
Finally, it is worth noting that despite the escalating tensions between China and Japan in
the 1920s and 1930s, the Chinese population in Tokyo did not disappear. In fact, there was much
continuity: even the Kanda Chinatown, which Kashima Shigeru argued was mostly destroyed in
the earthquake, did not completely vanish right away. Although many students chose to return to
China, some others chose to stay. In fact, even after the war broke out between Japan and China
in 1937, students continued to arrive in Tokyo as government-sponsored study in Japan was still
permitted, since the Republic of China still maintained diplomatic ties to Japan during the war.
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The Chinese scholar Paul Yu-kuang Sun, whose letters are preserved in the Yale Divinity
School Library, was an example of someone who studied in Japan using government funds at the
height of World War II.136 Sun was a student in Tokyo in 1939, at Waseda University. In a letter
addressed to his daughter’s family in 1981, Sun recounts the time he spent in Japan: he “first
lived in the dorms of Higashi-Nakano, before moving into the dorms in Kanda.”137 Kanda, at the
time, had already become a district known for its bookstores—the fame it would carry up to this
day—and Sun remembers spending hours in the bookstores each day.138 Sun also describes how
he would often visit famous author Natsume Sōseki’s grave not so far from campus, and how he
first read Edgar Snow’s account of the Chinese Communist Party, Red Star Over China, in
Waseda University’s library.139 Sun’s experience suggests that Chinese students in Tokyo at the
time still closely interacted with both literary ideas and radical politics, a continuation of what
was happening earlier on in the century; the students in Tokyo were still being exposed to leftist
ideas that had formerly inspired figures like Wang Xitian, that had contributed to the closing of
socioeconomic gaps between various “Chinese populations” and “Chinese experiences,” to the
formation and consolidation of a unified ethnic identity and one shared “Chinese experience.”
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Bibliographical Essay: A Journey through the Life and Legacy of Wang Xitian

I probably first came across the name of Wang Xitian toward the end of 2020, back when
I had no idea of who he was and had no idea that I would spend an entire year reading and
writing about his life. When discussing potential periods and groups to look into for research
projects, Professor Botsman suggested to me the first few decades of the early 20th century, and
fleetingly mentioned the names of a few social activists; Wang’s was very likely among them.
But back then, I was still considering doing something with Japan-related primary sources at
Yale’s archives, and didn’t give Wang much thought. It wasn’t until half a year later that he
came up again in another conversation with Professor Botsman, and I decided to take a look at
his Japanese Wikipedia page.
The page didn’t contain much information: it summarized his life as a student in Tokyo,
mentioned that he was in Tokyo at the same time as Zhou Enlai, and talked about his
assassination by the Japanese army. Then, I was already considering writing something about the
Chinese population in Tokyo and using Zhou Enlai’s diary as a primary source, so I thought
Wang could be included as a diversifying factor, as his experience and fate was surely different
from Zhou Enlai’s. I realized almost all the references on the Wikipedia page pointed to one
book: Tahara Yō’s Kantō Daishinsai to Chūgokujin: Ō Kiten Jiken wo Tsuisekisuru (The Great
Kanto Earthquake and the Chinese: Tracing the Wang Xitian Incident). It turned out that there
were only two copies of this book in university libraries across the United States, and Yale did
not have a copy. As I waited for Japanese librarian Haruko Nakamura’s order of the book to
arrive, I mused upon the lack of Wang Xitian-related research in English scholarship, and started
considering studying his life as of some meaning: after all, one advantage I had as a trilingual
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individual was that I could read sources about this person in Chinese and Japanese, and present
his life to an English-speaking audience that had never heard of it through my writing.
As I waited for the book to arrive, I started reading one of the most readily available and
famous primary sources this essay used: Zhou Enlai’s diary in Japan. Back then, my plan was to
present a spectrum of Chinese experiences in the early 20th-century Tokyo, and include small
sections on a variety of figures from political and literary spheres. However, as I read, the diary
started surprising me. I did not realize that this diary was not an excerpt from Zhou’s life-long
habit of diary-keeping, but the only time in his entire life that he wrote a diary; I also did not
realize that the “published” diary in Chinese was in fact poorly photocopied and not transcribed.
As a result, I had to borrow a transcribed and translated Japanese version of the diary (Yabuki’s
version) in order to make sense of all of the cursive. But most of all, I saw Wang Xitian’s name
in Zhou’s diary: not once, not twice, but twenty-eight times within the course of less than half a
year. As I saw Zhou Enlai’s description of his social circles, of their gatherings and
correspondences, I started considering more how the figures I thought of writing on connected to
each other and formed their own community.
It was around the same time that I started taking Professor Hannah Shepherd’s “Colonial
Cities” seminar, which inspired me to think about imperial spaces and their relation to different
groups. I read Eric Han’s Rise of a Japanese Chinatown when I was working on a mapping
project on Yokohama for that class, and read about the evolution of diversified Chinese
experiences in the treaty port of Yokohama, how the Chinese-speaking districts of Yokohama
were in fact divided according to socioeconomic class and political faction. It was in the same
book that I read about Liang Qichao’s articles that advocated for selective Chinese mixed
residence and led to Imperial Rescript 352. Slowly, things I had been reading started to piece
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together into a larger picture: segregation by socioeconomic class, imperial management of
foreign populations, spatial clusters in which various Chinese experiences occurred. Just like in
Yokohama, in Tokyo there was also division; Zhou Enlai and his circle of Chinese students had a
starkly different experience from Chinese workers, and Wang Xitian, with his background as a
student and his advocacy for workers’ rights, became a bridge that linked the two experiences.
The importance of Wang Xitian’s life revealed itself to me.
After Tahara’s book arrived, I dove into it, attempting to find more facts and sources on
Wang Xitian’s life. The book was very valuable; although it focused on the murder of Wang
Xitian and the massacre of the Chinese workers in Tokyo after the 1923 earthquake, it also had
considerable amounts of facts about Wang’s life. Unfortunately, like many Japanese academic
volumes (as I later learned from Professor Botsman), this book was very ambiguous about its
specific sources and there were no footnotes. However, this book had a unique valuable aspect:
Tahara tracked down the man who killed Wang, and managed to get a testimony from him that
contained unparalleled details on the specifics of Wang’s murder. Therefore, sections of this
book became primary sources on their own.
As I struggled to find more primary sources on Wang, I accidentally went down an
Internet rabbit hole in late November that led me to the knowledge that Jilin Province in China,
where Wang was from, had published two volumes named Wang Xitian Jinian Wenji (Anthology
in Memory of Wang Xitian) and Wang Xitian Dangan Shiliao Xuanbian (Selected Historical
Archives on Wang Xitian) to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Wang’s birth. Without
knowing at all what those two volumes contained, I immediately asked Yale’s Chinese librarian
Michael Meng to order them for me from China. That turned out to be the best decision I made
throughout the writing of this thesis, for the two volumes contained some of my most valuable
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primary sources. The Shiliao Xuanbian consisted of government correspondence between China
and Japan relevant to Wang’s death and a very complete collection of bureaucratic documents
related to Wang’s student days, such as registration forms, stipend checks, and application letters
to the government; it not only transcribed most, but also included plenty of photocopied pages of
original documents from the archives. The discovery of Wang signing “memorial day for the
country’s shame” next to his name on a government stipend check was made here, along with
many other details that helped me reconstruct Wang’s life. The Jinian Wenji, on the other hand,
contained a collection of biographical articles on Wang’s life across the last century.
I was, however, always wary that these two Chinese sources were published in the 90s
and inevitably influenced by CCP censorship and propaganda. Especially given Wang’s
connection to Zhou Enlai and other figures central to CCP’s founding, I was extremely cautious
of the tone of the sources and the way they were selected and presented. In particular, I tried to
avoid two types of sources as much as possible: biographical work written after the Communist
takeover of China in 1949, for they heavily romanticized Wang’s life and always portrayed him
as a figure who sacrificed his future for China; and sources that were translated from Japanese,
for translation itself could be intentionally curated to serve propagandic purposes. Among all the
primary sources present in those two volumes, I found earlier sources written in Chinese the
most reliable, as well as a particular piece of biographical work, Xie Jiemei’s Wang Xitian
Xiaoshi (Brief History on Wang Xitian’s Life). Although this piece was also written after Wang’s
death for commemorative purposes, Xie’s identity as Wang’s contemporary and close friend
made his account more reliable than later ones. I do realize the source’s limitations: Xie’s
potential romanticization of Wang’s life and the natural flaws of his own memory. In order to
avoid the two, I filtered the more emotional sections and focused on factual ones, and confirmed
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important dates and timelines with the bureaucratic sources in the Jilin Archives (it turned out
that Xie’s account was very aligned with the timeline pieced together from the archives, which
increased his reliability for me and made me more unafraid to refer to Xie’s quotes).
As for primary sources originally written in Japanese, I initially had trouble locating
them; but as I was reluctant to use Chinese translations of Japanese sources for reasons stated
above, I started looking under specific names that occurred multiple times in secondary
literature. That was when Imai Seiichi’s name came up: one of his books was listed as one of
Tahara’s main sources, and he was quoted several times by scholars in the Jinian Wenji. With
Haruko Nakamura’s help, I successfully located a published primary source collection edited by
Imai, Shiryōshū, Kantō Daishinsai-ka no Chūgokujin Gyakusatsu Jiken (Archives for the
Massacre of Chinese after the Great Kantō Earthquake). Initially I thought it might provide
some contexts for Wang’s death, but I realized, after reading through the thick volume, that it
contained both police records that proved the surveillance of Wang by the Tokyo Metropolitan
Police and formerly top-secret records on the concealing of Wang’s death and the Ōshima-machi
massacre! There were also other valuable Japanese primary sources, including Kubono’s diary
and the banned Yomiuri article on Wang’s death. This volume, along with the two from Jilin
Archives, became one of my best collection of sources. I was extremely lucky to come across a
subject hardly written about by scholars but with a plethora of published primary sources; at a
time like this when I couldn’t easily travel to Jilin or Tokyo to consult the sources, these
published volumes made my research possible.
While I consulted primary sources in Chinese and Japanese and pieced together Wang’s
life, I also kept researching the two populations he linked together, and the spatial distribution of
these populations in Tokyo. The location and life of students was easier to figure out: as Zhou’s
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diary as well as Yabuki’s commentaries consistently mentioned Kanda, I did more research into
the history of Kanda, and came across the Kashima book that discussed the history of the Kanda
Chinatown. As for the life of individuals, the prominent nature of many students and their
identity as prolific writers made their histories easily accessible; but this accessibility also made
writing about their lives less original, because the literary figures are so well-known. Eventually,
when revising my thesis, I cut out a 1500-word section on the literary landscape in early 20th
century Kanda, one that elaborated on Lu Xun’s nationalist publications and the founding of the
Creation Society by Guo Moruo and Yu Dafu. Although I gathered interesting information on
the social networks of such figures, compared to the rest of this thesis, that section was indeed
less unique. In the end, I condensed the section on Kanda and focused on the location as a site
for intellectual exchanges and growing national consciousness rather than the life of individuals
there.
The research on Ōshima-machi and the workers, on the other hand, was a completely
different experience. Before I encountered the Imai volume, I almost had no sources relevant to
the workers; Xie Jiemei wrote about the workers, but in a more generalized way and focused
more on what Wang did for the workers than on the life of workers themselves. However, Xie
mentioned the deportations as a reason for Wang’s founding of Mutual Aid Associations.
Therefore, I employed the most basic method: keyword-searching in Yomiuri’s online database. I
tried multiple keywords, and eventually located the report on the Minami-Senju deportations; the
rough time matched Xie’s description, so I searched through every issue in that month and found
more information on the Ōshima-machi deportations. Then I searched for issues on and around
the same dates in the Asahi archives—for their articles, unlike Yomiuri, do not have keyword
search and can only be searched by date—to compare details and ascertain accuracy. These
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newspaper searches, as well as parts of the section on Imperial Rescript 352 and the two maps in
said section, were made during the writing of the final paper for Professor Shepherd’s “Colonial
Cities” seminar on the management of Chinese populations over time by the Japanese
government in Tokyo. While the same sources were used, this thesis focuses less on colonial
themes present in Japan’s management of its cities and more on the internal division and
subsequent effort of unification among Chinese populations in Tokyo, an effort Wang Xitian
represents to some extent.
In the end, I was able to link the three sections—students, workers, and Wang Xitian—
using primary sources, and fit them into a larger historical context through consulting secondary
sources on Japan’s imperial democracy at the time and responses to the earthquake. The process
was difficult, but rewarding: not only was the formation of an argument satisfying, there were
also interesting moments in sources that made me laugh or stop to reflect. Zhou Enlai’s diary still
remains one of my favorite sources, for in the brief year he cared to record his everyday life as a
student, I discovered and resonated with many of his struggles: his statement that he would study
13 hours a day after realizing he failed an entrance exam, his one day of diary written in English
right before an English exam, even his reluctance to return to China as a protest of the secret pact
(for he, presumably, was about to take another entrance exam soon) made him more real a person
than I have ever encountered in history books and official accounts (which might be the reason
there was no widely circulated, fully transcribed versions of his diary in China).
The same applies for Wang Xitian: when I saw his continuously failed plans to transfer
his scholarship to Germany due to bureaucratic inefficiency, I immediately sympathized with his
frustration; when I read his letter applying to cancel his scholarship for “severe health issues,” I
laughed because I knew he was really just transitioning to social work and making up an excuse
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for the government. Those extremely relatable moments made me feel more affiliated to those
historical figures as people and more passionate about writing out their lives, telling their stories
through my 50-page project, for the way they so definitely and energetically existed should not
be so easily forgotten. Nor should violence and the injustice people like Wang faced be
forgotten; but I hope this essay lets Wang Xitian be remembered not by the way he died, but by
the way he lived. Short-lived as his activism and the façade of peace maintained for Chinese
workers in Tokyo were, they had their own continued legacy, one that gave me hope in a world
today where we can often feel our agency is lost in uncontrollable events arguably equally
disruptive as the Great Kantō Earthquake.
Finally, I owe the information in the final section about the legacy of the Kanda
Chinatown to Professor Kang-I Sun Chang, who has generously offered me her time for an oral
interview and a copy of her father’s letter about his time in Tokyo. I was initially having trouble
fitting this valuable information into my thesis, for Paul Sun arrived in Tokyo way later than the
other people I was writing about; however, it has turned out to be the perfect ending for the
thesis, for it shows how the Kanda Chinatown lived on, if not in physical form, then in spirit,
through the generations of Chinese students who continued to live in Japan.
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